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8.2. All change with 
qualified majority 
voting: relations with 
the Council
The biggest alterations in relations between the 
Euro pean Commission and the Council of Minis­
ters during this period were caused by the signifi­
cant changes in the rules on voting procedures in­
troduced first by the Single European Act, then by 
the Maastricht Treaty and finally by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. In each case what mattered was not 
just the formal change to the rules that were agreed 
upon, but also the patterns of interaction that the 
three institutions most directly involved  — the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Com­
mission  — worked out among themselves in the 
months and years following each treaty change. 
Changing rules of procedure and evolving practice 
were as important, in other words, as treaty amend­
ment. Each of these modifications will be discussed 
in the pages that follow. In addition, mention will 
be made of the growing size and expertise of the 
Council Secretariat during the 1990s, and especial­
ly the emergence of a Council­based European High 
Representative in the foreign policy sphere — a new 
role that challenged some of the Commission’s as­
sumptions about its own foreign policy responsibil­
ities. There was also the looming question of how 
the Council of Ministers would cope with a massive 
increase in the number of Member States, a change 
the timing of which was uncertain, but the inevit­
ability of which grew throughout the years under 
review. But the basic direction of travel was deter­
mined by the three rounds of treaty change and the 
altered patterns of behaviour that ensued.
The first big change sprang from the introduction of 
the cooperation procedure for some European legis­
lation in the Single European Act — a rule change 
that made possible the recourse to qualified majority 
voting for most of the proposed legislation connect­
ed to the single market project. The impact of large­
scale majority voting was as much psychological as it 
was practical. The insistence that all major decisions 
be taken by unanimity had led to real delays (1). As a 
result, the opening up of the possibility of majority 
voting  — and the de facto elimination of the Lux­
embourg compromise, although a number of Mem­
ber States would take some time to accept that it 
had gone — did make it easier and quicker to pass 
new laws. But just as important — if not even more 
 vital — was the transformation that occurred in the 
expectations of both the Member States themselves 
and the European Commission. As Riccardo Peris­
sich, Deputy Director­General for the Internal Mar­
ket and Industrial Affairs in 1986­1987 and then Dir­
ector­General for Industry between 1990 and 1994, 
recalls: ‘the reality became very different because, 
having started to vote and having accepted that votes 
were going to take place, it became an unstoppable 
machinery’ (2). This meant that Member States that 
would once have been inclined to veto — or to rely on 
others to veto for them — now had radically to alter 
their behaviour. To some extent this meant seeking 
amendments and alterations that made more palat­
able measures that, in an earlier period, they would 
simply have blocked. But it also affected attitudes to­
wards the actual vote. To quote Perissich once more: 
‘The behaviour of different countries 
sometimes reflects their culture. There are 
governments — the Germans are among 
them — who, when they are in minority, 
they prefer to be outvoted … so they can tell 
home that: “We tried, but we were outvoted. 
Of course, we are still convinced we are 
right but the majority was against this.” But 
those are the exceptions. Most of the 
governments, when they realise that they 
are in a minority, they give up. So, if you 
(1) Notorious examples of delay included the nearly 20 years needed to agree 
upon the mutual recognition of architects’ qualifications. For the back­
ground see Comte, E., ‘La formation du régime européen de migrations, 
1947­1992’, PhD thesis, Université Paris­Sorbonne, Paris, 2014, pp. 246­
247.
(2) Interview with Riccardo Perissich, 17 May 2016, p. 12.
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look at the numbers, you can see that the 
great major ity of decisions were made by 
unanimous vote. In fact, that wasn’t the 
case. Simply, at some point the Presi dency 
says: “Look, I have a qualified majority: what 
do we do?” And then most people said: 
“Well, okay. Go ahead.”’ (1).
The change in the likely outcome of individual votes 
also had a wider impact on the atmosphere within 
the Council of Ministers  — giving all involved a 
strong sense of powerful, almost irresistible forward 
momentum — and on the behaviour of crucial of­
fice holders within it, especially the Member State 
holding the rotating presidency, with each succes­
sive Member State vying to outdo their predecessors 
in the amount of progress they could make towards 
the 1992 objective (2) — all the more so given that 
from 1987 a change in the Council’s internal regu­
lations allowed the presidency to trigger each vote. 
The capacity of the substantially enlarged Council 
Secretariat to draft potential compromise texts also 
helped matters. These changes thus created almost 
the ideal conditions for a European Commission 
intent on pushing through an ambitious range of 
new legislation, as was the case in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.
Crucially, this new momentum allowed the Coun­
cil of Ministers to pass on time almost all of the 
legis lation required to complete the single market 
by the 31 December 1992 deadline. The spike in the 
amount of Community legislation passed in the sin­
gle year was unprecedented: in 1992 a total of 166 
directives were passed, more than twice that of any 
other year (before or after) within the  per iod  covered 
by this volume (3). Under the pre­Single Euro pean 
Act voting regime there would have been little 
chance of this lawmaking surge being  successfully 
(1) Interview with Riccardo Perissich, 17 May 2016, p. 12. 
(2) Interview with Riccardo Perissich, 17 May 2016.
(3) Figures taken from European Community/European Union Gene­
ral  Reports, 1986­2000: European Commission, General Report on the 
 Activities of the European Communities/European Union, Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1986­2000.
carried through. Qualified majority voting was in 
other words a vital prerequisite for the Commu­
nity’s most fertile phase of legislative activity. 
Both the changed voting rules and the acceleration 
of legislative output that this permitted had import­
ant implications for the European Commission’s 
interaction with the Council of Ministers. For a 
start, the fact that the new voting rules applied to 
some policy areas and not to others made the Com­
mission’s choice of legal base even more sensitive an 
issue than before. In the course of the decade and 
a half covered by this volume there were repeated 
instances of the Commission’s choice of legal base 
being disputed by the Member States, at least one 
of which ended up before the Court of Justice  (4). 
The acceleration in legislative activity, meanwhile, 
made it ever more challenging for the Commission’s 
Secretariat­General, which was responsible for over­
seeing all interaction between the Commission and 
different levels of the Council pyramid, to keep 
control of all that went on. There had always been 
incidents in which the normal rules of procedure 
were ignored. In December 1986, before the new 
voting rules came into play, Horst Günter  Krenzler, 
the Deputy Secretary­General, wrote in concerned 
terms to Pascal Lamy, the President’s head of cab­
inet, about a number of instances during the UK 
Council Presidency when representatives of the Sec­
retariat­General had been wrongly excluded from 
crucial points of the discussion (5). But as the pace 
of advance increased the challenge of keeping on 
top of all that went on between the two institutions 
became ever more acute. The way in which  David 
Williamson, the Secretary­General, felt obliged 
periodically to reissue a letter reminding all Com­
missioners and their cabinets of the need to allow 
(4) For a discussion of the issue see note from Diane Schmitt, HAEU, DORIE 
524, ‘Notes on the legal and institutional matters raised in the instances of 
the Council’, 16 April 1996.
(5) HAEU, DORIE 524, SG(86) D/14.945, 9 December 1986, ‘Note for the 
attention of Mr Lamy, the President’s head of cabinet, on the role and 
functions of the Secretariat­General in relations with the Council and the 
means necessary to exercise it — problems encountered recently in specific 
cases’.
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the Secretariat­General to play its coordinating role 
speaks volumes, for instance (1).
Complicating matters still further was the grow­
ing need to include the Parliament in the legislative 
process. In earlier periods interaction with the Par­
liament was limited, since Strasbourg had few real 
powers. This did not stop Members of the Euro pean 
Parliament seeking to exercise an influence over 
Community legislation  — and periodically suc­
ceeding  (2). Under the voting rules that prevailed 
for all but budgetary matters until the mid 1980s, 
however, three­way consultation could be kept to 
a minimum. But as the Parliament’s stature as a 
co­legislator grew — first with the cooperation pro­
cedure, then with co­decision — ever greater efforts 
(1) The note was originally produced in February 1989: HAEU, DORIE 524, 
SEC(89)  250, 14  February 1989, ‘Note for the attention of the heads of 
 cabinet on the role and functions of the Secretariat­General with regard to 
relations with the Council’. It was reissued less than a year later on 10 Janu­
ary 1990, and the substance was reiterated in each new vade mecum on 
Commission–Council relations.
(2) The extent to which even the early Parliament was able to exercise a degree 
of influence over legislation, despite its lack of formal powers, emerges 
strongly from Roos, M., ‘The power of nuisance — The European Parlia­
ment’s gain in power in the area of Community social policy, 1952­1979’, 
PhD thesis, University of Luxembourg, 2018.
needed to be made to ensure that the Parliament 
did not feel that it was being kept out of a dialogue 
between the Council and the Commission. The 
necessity of ensuring that the Parliament was con­
sulted before any major change was made to draft 
legislation became a staple of the multiple codes of 
conduct drawn up between the Parliament and the 
Commission during the 1990s (3).
This became even more true once the Maastricht 
Treaty of 1992 not only extended the number of 
fields in which the cooperation procedure could be 
employed, but also introduced the new co­ decision 
procedure. Under co­decision the Parliament’s 
 powers grew still further, notably through the intro­
duction of a potential third reading stage involving 
the establishment of a conciliation committee, at 
which Council representatives and parliamentar­
ians would seek to overcome their disagreements (4). 
(3) See Chapter 8.3 ‘From love affair to stand­off: relations with the European 
Parliament’.
(4) For details of the procedure and the way in which it has been implemented 
in practice see O’Dwyer, U., ‘La dynamique historique des relations inter­
institutionnelles — Le point de vue d’un praticien sur l’évolution de la pro­
cédure de codécision’, Revue du droit de l’Union européenne, No 3, Éditions 
Clément Juglar, Paris, 2010, pp. 487­525.
View of the 1470th meeting of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council on 28 January 1991.
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A major gain for the Parliament, this new set of pro­
cedures involved a potential threat to the Commis­
sion’s role, since final decisions taken at the third 
reading would largely depend on a bilateral engage­
ment between the two other legislative bodies, with 
the Commission marginalised (1). In practice, how­
ever, this threat has proved to be less serious than 
initially feared by some in the Commission. While 
some of the early examples of legislation being de­
cided by co­decision did place the Commission in 
an uncomfortable position, informal practices soon 
grew up that allowed a real three­way discussion (or 
trilogue) between the three institutions to develop, 
and permitted the Commission to gain a vital role 
as mediator and honest broker. From 1999 onwards 
the Commission also benefited from the Parlia­
ment’s decision to allow its representatives to attend 
as observers the preliminary discussions among 
Members of the European Parliament about their 
approach to the trilogue. This helped restore a use­
ful level of symmetry to the Commission’s know­
ledge of the other parties’ positions, as the Com­
mission already attended the preparations of the 
Council position by the Permanent Representatives 
Committee (Coreper) as of right, and thereby made 
it easier for the Commission to perform a mediating 
role (2). 
The final treaty­driven procedural change in the 
legis lative process came about in the wake of the 
Amsterdam Treaty. Here the main changes to the 
legislative process were first a further extension of 
the areas of European Union business covered by the 
co­decision procedure, and second a streamlining of 
the procedure allowing decisions to be taken at a 
much earlier stage. In part this involved recognition 
that the informal three­way dialogue could begin 
from the outset of the process, rather than having 
to await the third reading (3). This change not only 
(1) Interview with Una O’Dwyer, 16 February 2018.
(2) Ibid.
(3) O’Dwyer, ‘La dynamique historique des relations interinstitutionnelles’, 
p. 503.
speeded up legislative decision­making, but also 
further enshrined the Commission’s honest­broker 
role (4). This role furthermore could be played at all 
three stages of the procedure, and not just during 
the third as had originally been stipulated.
Also significant to Commission–Council relations 
during this period was the gradual strengthening 
of the Council’s own Secretariat. This trend had 
started in the early 1980s with the appointment 
of Niels  Ersbøll as Secretary­General  (5). It was 
counter­ balanced furthermore with the even more 
rapid growth of the European Commission itself. 
Nevertheless, between 1986 and 2000 the Council 
Secretariat expanded significantly, acquiring in the 
process capabilities and expertise that at best could 
complement those of the Commission, but could 
also be seen as a challenge. No longer was the Coun­
cil Secretariat purely designed to organise meetings 
and facili tate discussion between Member States’ 
representatives; in certain fields it was now acquiring 
a degree of policy expertise that could provide an al­
ternative ‘European­minded’ policy input to that of 
the Commission. In no field was this clearer than 
foreign policy, where Member State determination to 
emphasise that this remained primarily an intergov­
ernmental rather than supranational policy preserve 
meant that when a European High Representative, 
Javier  Solana, was appointed in 1999, he was attached 
to the Council of Ministers rather than to the Com­
mission. Chris Patten, the first External Relations 
Commissioner to have to work closely with the new 
High Representative, talks in upbeat fashion about 
the very effective modus vivendi that he was able to 
establish with his Spanish counterpart, but the im­
plicit institutional rivalry with the Commission 
could not be entirely disregarded (6). 
(4) Interview with Una O’Dwyer, 16 February 2018.
(5) See Bussière et al., The European Commission 1973-86, p. 220.
(6) For a discussion of the modus vivendi see interview with Chris Patten, 
11 October 2016.
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A final and important trend was the mounting 
concern, in the Commission but also shared wide­
ly elsewhere, about the ability of the Council of 
Ministers to cope with the increase in the number 
of Member States  — and the inevitable knock­on 
effects that this would have in terms of decision­ 
making effectiveness. The Commission, after all, 
had already been worried about how the Council 
was coping with Spanish and Portuguese member­
ship, in other words a rise in Member State numbers 
from 10 to 12. In March 1988 Marcell von Donat 
had written to Carlo Trojan, the new Deputy Sec­
retary­General, denouncing the continued use of a 
‘tour de table’ as a relic of 19th century diplomacy, 
and spelling out the implications for the Commis­
sion of a larger number of Member States: ‘It is al­
ready clear that a group of 13 delegations (Council/
Coreper) can no longer negotiate within a meeting 
once there are more than two different positions. 
The real negotiation then takes place via bilateral 
contacts between the presidency, the Commission 
and certain delegations, and in fact that happens be­
fore the debate takes place. With more delegations, 
the Commission has to change its approach by step­
ping up negotiations with the Member States and 
just formalising the outcome of these negotiations 
at the level of the Community institutions’ (1). How 
much more difficult would it become as numbers 
climbed from 12 to 15 in the mid 1990s, with an in­
crease to 20 or more foreseeable in the early years of 
the 21st century? There was anxiety in the Commis­
sion that the growing size of the European Union 
(1) HAEU, DORIE 524, ‘Note for the attention of Mr Trojan on the Commis­
sion’s reflection seminar of 30 April 1988’, 29 March 1988.
Niels Ersbøll (first left) and Jacques Delors (second right) got on well, which facilitated the progress of European integration. 
They had an informal meeting with Norman Lamont (opposite Jacques Delors), UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, at the meeting 
of the Council of Finance Ministers on 23 November 1992.
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would cause Council decision­making to slip back 
into the pattern of impasse and delay that had been 
decisively broken in the mid 1980s. This was one of 
the constant background issues in the debate about 
enlargement. Still greater use of majority voting was 
certainly part of the answer, especially in the revised 
co­decision procedure discussed above. But as von 
Donat’s note had suggested, other alterations in be­
haviour also needed to be explored. This was to have 
been the main business of the Treaty of Nice, but 
when this proved inadequate it became something 
that would have to await first the abortive European 
constitution and then the Lisbon Treaty of 2008.
Piers Ludlow
8.3. From love affair to 
stand-off: relations 
with the European 
Parliament
The relationship between the European Commis­
sion and the European Parliament evolved substan­
tially during the years under review. At first this 
change was largely positive: Jacques Delors would 
enjoy a generally good relationship with Strasbourg 
and would be given substantial credit by Members 
of the European Parliament (MEPs) for transform­
ing the European Community (EC) system for the 
better. It was Delors seemingly who had been most 
important in delivering the first substantial increase 
in the Parliament’s powers since 1979; it was Delors 
furthermore who brought to a mutually satisfac tory 
end the lengthy struggle between the Parliament 
and the Council/Commission over the setting of 
Community budgets. More broadly, Delors and 
his Commissions were given credit for delivering 
both ‘more Europe’ — in the form of enhanced in­
tegration — and more attention to Europe, both of 
which were regarded as welcome developments by 
most MEPs. But this highly positive relationship 
began to sour as the 1990s advanced, with Parlia­
ment–Commission relations becoming that much 
more antagonistic. And the rise of mutual suspicion 
would culminate in the biggest single crisis in Stras­
bourg–Brussels relations to date, namely the row 
that would precipitate the collective resignation of 
the Santer Commission in 1999.
It had all started so well. Jacques Delors was not 
the first Commission President to promise MEPs 
that he would take Parliament more seriously than 
ever before; François­Xavier Ortoli, Roy Jenkins 
and Gaston Thorn had all made similar pledges (1). 
Nor was he unique in having been a member of 
(1) See Bussière et al., The European Commission 1973-86, p. 231.
